Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition of agents is winning if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or equals a specified quota. The Banzhaf index is a measure of voting power of an agent in a weighted voting game. It depends on the number of coalitions in which the agent is the difference in the coalition winning or losing. It is well known that computing Banzhaf indices in a weighted voting game is NP-hard. We give a comprehensive classification of weighted voting games which can be solved in polynomial time. Among other results, we provide a polynomial (O(k( n k ) k )) algorithm to compute the Banzhaf indices in weighted voting games in which the number of weight values is bounded by k.
Introduction

Motivation and Background
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are mathematical models which are used to analyze voting bodies in which the voters have different number of votes. In WVGs, each voter is assigned a nonnegative weight and makes a vote in favour of or against a decision. The decision is made if and only if the total weight of those voting in favour of the decision is greater than or equal to some fixed quota. Since the weights of the players do not always exactly reflect how critical a player is in decision making, voting power attempts to measure the ability of a player in a WVG to determine the outcome of the vote. WVGs are also encountered in threshold logic, reliability theory, neuroscience and logical computing devices [15, 16] . Parhami [13] points out that voting has a long history in reliability systems dating back to von Neumann [17] . For reliability systems, the weights of a WVG can represent the significance of the components whereas the quota can represent the threshold for the overall system to fail. WVGs have been applied in various political and economic organizations [1, 2] . Voting power is also used in joint stock companies where each shareholder gets votes in proportion to the ownership of a stock [8] .
The Banzhaf index is considered the most suitable power index by voting power theorists [11, 7] . The computational complexity of computing Banzhaf indices in WVGs is well studied. Prasad and Kelly [14] show that the problem of computing the Banzhaf values of players is #P-complete. It is even NP-hard to identify a player with zero voting power or two players with same Banzhaf indices [12] . Klinz and Woeginger [10] devised the fastest exact algorithm to compute Banzhaf indices in a WVG. In the algorithm, they applied a partitioning approach that dates back to Horowitz and Sahni [9] . However the complexity of the algorithm is still O(n 2 2 n 2 ). In this paper, we restrict our analysis to exact computation of Banzhaf indices instead of examining approximate solutions. We show that although computing Banzhaf indices of WVGs is a hard problem in general, it is easy for various classes of WVGs, e.g., for WVGs with a bounded number of weight values, an important sub-class of WVGs.
Outline
Section 2 provides the preliminary definitions of terms used in the paper. The outline of the paper is as following. Section 3 identifies WVGs in which Banzhaf indices can be computed in constant time. In Section 4, we examine WVGs with a bounded number of weight values, and provide algorithms to compute the Banzhaf indices. Section 5 examines WVGs with special weight distributions. Section 6 considers WVGs with integer weights. We conclude with some open problems in the final section.
Preliminaries
We give definitions of key terms. The set of voters is N = {1, ..., n}. Generally, 1 2 1≤i≤n w i ≤ q ≤ 1≤i≤n w i so that there can be no two disjoint winning coalitions. Such weighted voting games are termed proper.
Definitions 2.3.
A player i is critical in a coalition S when S ∈ W and (S \ i) / ∈ W . For each i ∈ N , we denote the number of coalitions in which i is critical in game v by η i (v). The Banzhaf index of player i in weighted voting game v is β i =
Coleman's power of the collectivity to act, A, is defined as the ratio of the number of winning coalitions w to 2 n : A = w/2 n .
The problem of computing the Banzhaf indices of a WVG can be defined formally as following: Also, in a WVG with n equal weights u, the probabilistic Banzhaf index of each player is then n−1 ⌈q/u⌉−1 /2 n−1 . We can also compute Coleman's power of the collectivity to act, A, which is equal to w 2 n . A dictator is a player who is present in every winning coalition and absent from every losing coalition. This means that the player 1 with the biggest weight is a dictator if and only if w 1 ≥ q and 2≤i≤n w i < q. In that case, β 1 = 1 and β i = 0 for all i > 1.
If 0 < q ≤ w n then the only minimal winning coalitions are all the singleton coalitions. So there are n minimal winning coalitions and every player is critical in one coalition. Thus, for all i, β i = 1/n and the Banzhaf indices can be found in constant time (i.e., O (1)). Moreover, the probablistic Banzhaf index β 
Bounded number of weight values
In this section we estimate the time complexity of several algorithms. We start off with the case when all weights except one are equal and give exact formulas for the Banzhaf indices. We then use this as a warm up exercise to consider more general cases where there are 2 weight values and then k weight values.
All weights except one are equal
We start off with the case when all weights except one are equal. x . The player with weight w a is critical if it forms a winning a coalition with some players with weight w b but the coalition becomes losing with its exclusion. The player with weight w a can prove critical in coalition with varying number of players with weight w b . The maximum number of players with weight w b with which it forms a winning coalition and is also critical is y − 1 in case y ≤ m and m in case y > m. Therefore the total number of coalitions in which the player with weight w a is critical is
Only two different weight values
Unlike Theorem 4.1, we do not give a short formula for the Banzhaf values in the next theorem. However Theorem 4.2 considers a more general case than Theorem 4.1. As we shall we later Theorem 4.1 provides us with an idea to consider the case of k weight values. ⌉−1. Therefore j, the number of players with weight w b , satisfies the following inequality:
, and let
j . We define, the maximum possible number of extra players with weight a, to be maxa = Min(⌈q/w a ⌉ − 1, n a − 1). Then the total number of swings of the player with weight w a is maxa i=0 A i B i . The total number of swings for a player with weight w b can be computed by a symmetric method.
We can devise an algorithm (Algorithm 2) from the method outlined in the proof.
Output: Total swings of a player with weight w a .
1: swings a ← 0 2: maxa ← Min(⌈q/w a ⌉ − 1, n a − 1) 3: for i = 0 to maxa do 4:
6:
else if x 2 (i) < 0 then B i ← 0
13:
14:
end for Proof. We can represent a WVG v with k weight classes as follows:
k weight values
where n i is the number of players with weights w i for i = 1, . . . , k. Here, we extend Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 4 for k weight classes.
We can write v ′ as [q; (1, w 0 ), (n 1 −1, w 1 ), ..., (n k , w k )] where w 0 = w 1 . This makes it simpler to write a recursive function to compute the number of swings of player with weight w 0 . Let A i 1 ,i 2 ,...,im be the number of swings for w 0 where there are i j players with weight w j in the coalition for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Here the summation is taken over all values of i m for which the contribution is non-zero. Explicitly, this range is given by
The total number of swings of the player with weight w 0 is then A ǫ .
Algorithm 3 SwingsForWVG
Input: v = [q; (n 1 , w 1 ), (n 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (n k , w k )]. Output: Total number of swings, swings 0 , of a player with weight w 1 .
Output: Banzhaf indices, β = (β 1 , . . . β k ).
5:
totalswings ← totalswings + n i swings i 7: end for 8: for i = 1 to k do We observe that in a 2-geometric WVG (such as [q; 2 n , 2 n−1 , ..., ]), for any target sum of a coalition, we can use a greedy approach, trying to put bigger weights first, to come as close to the target as possible. This greedy approach was first identified by Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry [6] for a broader category of weighted voting games in which weights are unbalanced:
2. An unbalanced WVG is a WVG such that, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, w j > w j+1 +w j+2 ...+w n .
Example 5.3. The game [22; 18, 9, 4, 2, 1] is an example of an unbalanced WVG where each weight is greater than the sum of the subsequent weights.
Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry [6] showed that the greedy approach for unbalanced WVG with integer weights can help to compute all Banzhaf indices in O(n). We notice that the same algorithm can be used for an unbalanced WVG with real weights without any modification. In fact it is this property of 'geometric weights' being unbalanced which is the reason that we can find suitable coalitions for target sums so efficiently. We characterise those geometric sequences which give unbalanced WVGs:
Theorem 5.4. If r ≥ 2 then every r-geometric WVG is unbalanced.
Proof. Let v be an r-geometric WVG. We prove by induction that w j > w j+1 + . . . + w n . This is true for j = n. Suppose it is true for all i, j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since v is r-geometric, w j ≥ 2w j+1 . But, 2w j+1 = w j+1 + w j+1 > w j+1 + w j+2 + . . . + w n . Therefore v is unbalanced.
Corollary 5.5. For an r-geometric WVG v where r ≥ 2, the Banzhaf indices of players in v can be computed in O(n) time.
Proof. Since the condition of r ≥ 2 makes v an unbalanced WVG, then we can use the greedy algorithm from [6] which computes the Banzhaf indices in O(n).
Note that an r-geometric WVG is 2-unbalanced when r ≥ 1+ √ 5 2 ≈ 1.61803... = ϕ, the golden ratio, since then 1
We check whether 2-unbalanced WVGs have properties similar to those of unbalanced WVGs.
Example 5.7. Consider a WVG v with 2m players and weights
It is easy to see that j−1 i=0 2 · 3 i < 3 j , so the game is 2-unbalanced.
In the unbalanced game, for each target coalition sum, there is either one corresponding coalition or none. This does not hold for 2-unbalanced WVGs. In Example 5.7 with target total 1+ 3+ · · · + 3 m−1 = 1 2 (3 m − 1), there are exactly 2 m coalitions which give this target, namely those coalitions with exactly one player out of each equal pair.
We prove that even for the class of 2-unbalanced (instead of simply unbalanced WVGs) the problem of computing Banzhaf indices becomes NP-hard. Proof. We will use a reduction from the following NP-hard problem:
For the reduction from SUBSET SUM, we scale and modify the weights from the WVG v of Example 5.7. For any instance I = {z 1 , . . . , z m , T } of SUBSET SUM, we will define a game v I with 2m + 1 players. Let Z = 1 + m j=1 z j , and we may assume that T < Z. Whereas v had pairs of weights 3 j , 3 j for 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, in v I there is one "unit player" with weight 1 and 2m pairs of players with weights 3 j Z, 3 j Z + z j for 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. The quota for v I is We will show that to determine this is equivalent to answering the SUBSET SUM instance I, and so even this special case of BI-WVG is NP-hard.
In Example 5.7, it was necessary (and sufficient) for achieving the target total of 1 2 (3 m − 1) to take exactly one player from each pair. In game v I , since m j=1 z j < Z, this is still a necessary condition for achieving the total of 1 2 (3 m − 1)Z + T , and whether or not there is such a selection achieving the total is exactly the condition of whether there is a subset of the z j s which sums to T .
Sequential weights
Definition 5.9. The set of weights {w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n } is sequential if w n |w n−1 |w n−2 ...|w 1 , i.e. each weight is a multiple of the next weight. Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry [6] show that Banzhaf indices can be computed in O(n 2 ) time if the weights are sequential and they satisfy an additional dominance condition. The diminance conditions states that a weight in one weight class should be more than the sum of weights of any subsequent weight class. 
We now define the alternative dominance condition for WVGs. 
We provide an alternative dominance condition for weights which are not necessarily sequential. It is easy to see that a 2-unbalanced WVG does not necessarily satisfy the alternative dominance condition.
Proposition 5.14. Suppose a WVG v satisfies the alternative dominance condition. Then for v, BI-WVG has time complexity O(n 2 ).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 10 in [6] where the proof is for a sequential WVG which obeys the dominance condition. However we notice that since the argument in the proof can be made for any WVG which satisfies the alternative dominance condition, the proposition holds for v.
Integer weights
When all weights are integers, other methods may become applicable.
Moderate sized integer weights
Matsui and Matsui [12] prove that a dynamic programming approach provides a pseudo-polynomial algorithm to compute Banzhaf indices of all players with time complexity O(n 2 q). Since q is less than i∈N w i , the Banzhaf indices can be computed in polynomial time if the weight sizes are moderate.
Polynomial number of coefficients in the generating function of the WVG
A generating function is a formal power series whose coefficients encode information about a sequence. Bilbao et al. •
The coalitions in which player 1 is critical are {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}. Therefore η 1 = 3.
• B 2 (x) = (1 + x 5 )(1 + x 1 ) = 1 + x + x 5 + x 6 The coalition in which player 2 is critical is {1, 2}.
Therefore η 2 = 1.
•
The coalition in which player 3 is critical is {1, 3}. Therefore η 3 = 1.
Consequently, β 1 = 3/5, β 2 = 1/5 and β 3 = 1/5.
The generating function method provides an efficient way of computing Banzhaf indices if the voting weights are moderate integers. Bilbao et al. [4] prove that the computational complexity of computing Banzhaf indices by generating functions is O(n 2 C) where C is the number of non-zero coefficients in 1≤i≤n (1 + x w j ). We note that C can be bounded by the sum of the weights but the bound is not tight. C can be relatively small even if the weight values are exponential in n. Therefore if a W V G has a generating function in which the number of non-zero terms is polynomial in n, then the computational complexity of computing the Banzhaf indices is in P .
7 Open problems & conclusion 
